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Ethical perspectives on the use of stimulants to enhance human cognitive performance
(neuroenhancement) are polarized between conservative and liberal theories offering
opposing advice on whether individuals have a right to use neuroenhancers and what
the social outcomes of neuroenhancement might be. Meanwhile, empirical evidence
shows modest prevalence and guarded public attitudes toward the neuroenhancement
use of stimulants. In this Perspective, we argue that the dissonance between the
prescriptions of ethical theories (what ought to be) and empirical evidence (what is) has
impaired our understanding of neuroenhancement practices. This dissonance is a result
of three common errors in research on the ethics of neuroenhancement: (1) expecting
that public perspectives will conform to a prescriptive ethical framework; (2) ignoring the
socio-economic infrastructures that influence individuals’ decisions on whether or not
to use neuroenhancement; and (3) overlooking conflicts between fundamental ethical
values namely, safety of neuroenhancement and autonomy. We argue that in order
to understand neuroenhancement practices it is essential to recognize which values
affect individual decisions to use or refuse to use neuroenhancement. Future research
on the ethics of neuroenhancement should assess the morally significant values for
stakeholders. This will fill the gap between what ought to be done and what is done
with an improved understanding of what can be done within a particular context.
Clarifying conflicts between competing moral values is critical in conducting research
on the efficacy of substances putatively used for neuroenhancement and also on
neuroenhancement practices within academic, professional and social environments.
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BACKGROUND
Ethical perspectives on the use of substances to enhance human cognitive performance
(neuroenhancement) have become polarized between conservative and liberal normative theories
(Racine, 2010; Forlini and Racine, 2013). These theories stem from respective political stances
on technology and human enhancement that fundamentally disagree about whether individuals
have a right to use neuroenhancers and about the potential social outcomes of neuroenhancement
(Hughes, 2009; Reiner, 2013).
The liberal or meliorist approach maintains that “[h]uman history — or at least human
progress — is in great part the story of enhancement” (Buchanan, 2010) as reﬂected in the
development of tools, technology, and organized societies. Evolution, for its part, might be
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considered as the “original” process that enhanced human
capacities and characteristics. From this standpoint enhancement
should continue to be pursued because it promises to reduce
suﬀering and improve the quality of human life (Caplan, 2003;
Savulescu, 2006; Harris, 2007; Bostrom and Sandberg, 2009;
Buchanan, 2010). At the extreme of this liberal perspective
is transhumanism, a movement that embraces science and
technology in the hope of becoming “post-human, beings
with vastly greater capacities than present human beings have”
(Bostrom, 2003).
The conservative or anti-meliorist standpoint strives to
preserve “human nature”. From this position, enhancement poses
a risk to human existence because it may produce undesirable
physical and social changes in human beings (Fukuyama, 2002;
President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003; Sandel, 2004). Evolution,
conservatives argue, should not to be meddled with. The risk is
that in “enjoying the beneﬁts of biotechnology, we will need to
hold fast to an account of the human being, seen not in material
or mechanistic or medical terms but in psychic and moral
and spiritual ones” (President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003).
Biotechnology erodes the building blocks of the “human dignity”
as exempliﬁed by the discipline and eﬀort that are required to
attain excellence and that promote human ﬂourishing and our
identity (Kass, 2003).
There are many more nuanced positions between these
conservative and liberal views (Hughes, 2009; Reiner, 2013).
However, these opposing points of view represent extremes
in the broader “culture wars” that underlie bioethics debates
in the USA about stem cell research and end-of-life care
(Callahan, 2005; Hughes, 2009; Racine, 2010). The “culture wars”
reﬂect “radical moral-political divisions in the public domain”
(Racine, 2010) that mirror disagreements between conservative
and liberal moral and political positions. The fundamental
diﬀerences between conservative and liberal approaches to
enhancement make it diﬃcult to come to a shared understanding
of how to proceed at the institutional and community levels.
Some authors have declared an ethical stalemate because they
believe that the conservative and liberal positions can never be
reconciled and so cannot produce ethical advice for stakeholders
(e.g., students, health professionals, policy makers, academic
institutions, members of the general public) (Roache and Clarke,
2009; Banja, 2011).
Despite their diﬀerences, these two poles in the
neuroenhancement ethics debate both unwittingly and
uncritically promote the “myth of cognitive enhancement”
(Zohny, 2015). That is, they both assume that putatively
neuroenhancing substances do in fact enhance and that their use
is widespread and increasing. Neither of these assumptions is
well supported by empirical evidence (Lucke et al., 2011).
First, most of the prescription medications labeled as
neuroenhancers (i.e., prescription stimulants such as Ritalin,
Adderall and Modaﬁnil) have little, if any, enhancing eﬀect in
healthy individuals (Repantis et al., 2010a,b). A recent systematic
review reported that modaﬁnil provides some beneﬁt in complex
tasks but criticized the studies for their lack of sensitivity,
reproducibility and ecological validity (Battleday and Brem,
2015).
Second, the empirical survey evidence ﬁnds a very modest
prevalence of neuroenhancement use of stimulants, even in
academic environments, an alleged hotspot of use (Smith and
Farah, 2011). Public attitudes toward their use are guarded,
but not entirely conservative, reﬂecting a politically moderate
stance that is sensitive to salient ethical issues (Fitz et al., 2014).
Public attitudes also vary according context and experience
with neuroenhancement (Schelle et al., 2014). These survey
data do not support the claims of widespread and increasing
neuroenhancement use often made by proponents of the two
dominant normative approaches.
Why do stakeholder views and actions diﬀer from what is
widely assumed by the two ethical perspectives? How should
we marry normative theories (what ought to be) with empirical
evidence (what is) in this bioethics debate? As several authors
have argued, it is important to bring the two together because
it is “not only suﬃcient for an ethicist to discuss the moral
rightness or wrongness of a certain practice on a theoretical
level, but also to think about the conditions under which a norm
can be eﬀective in society” (Birnbacher, 1999) (de Vries and
Gordijn, 2009; Salloch et al., 2012). In this Perspective, we argue
that the dissonance between the opposing normative theories
and empirical data on stakeholder attitudes has impaired our
understanding of neuroenhancement practices. We describe key
features of this dissonance and outline an approach to research
on the ethics of neuroenhancement that may help to bridge the
gap between normative and empirical perspectives.
THREE COMMON ERRORS IN
RESEARCH ON THE ETHICS OF
NEUROENHANCEMENT
Empirical reality often limits human agency in ways that conﬂict
with normative or theoretical views (Potter, 1971; Hurst, 2010).
In the context of neuroenhancement, there are at least three
instances in which real life situations have contributed to errors
in ethical reﬂection.
Expecting that Public Perspectives will
Conform to a Prescriptive Ethical
Framework
Studies that elicit the perspectives of stakeholders on
neuroenhancement often identify the same issues discussed in
academic discourse on the topic (Schelle et al., 2014). However,
there are two important diﬀerences between stakeholder
perspectives and formal normative reﬂections. First, stakeholder
studies report the coexistence within individuals of conﬂicting
ethical perspectives (i.e., ambivalence) on neuroenhancement
and its acceptability in medical and academic environments
(Banjo et al., 2010; Hotze et al., 2011; Forlini and Racine,
2012b). This ambivalence is often evident in students’ reactions
to analogies between neuroenhancement use of caﬀeine and
sports doping, which can be taken as representing liberal and
conservative perspectives, respectively. Two studies have shown
that students analogise neuroenhancement and sports doping
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in competition but diﬀerentiate the two on the basis of the
magnitude of steroid eﬀects compared to the eﬀects of caﬀeine
or prescription stimulants (Forlini and Racine, 2012b; Bell et al.,
2013). In another study, 56% of a sample of German university
students saw no moral diﬀerence between neuroenhancement
and the use of caﬀeinated substances. However, 44% also said
that prescription stimulants and caﬀeine diﬀered in their side
eﬀects, medical risks and legal consequences (e.g., in using a
medical prescribed substance illegally). Just under half (46%) of
these students either did not or could not diﬀerentiate the two
types of substances. These students were uncertain about the
most appropriate policy framework (permissive or restrictive).
Second, the ethical acceptability of neuroenhancement seems
to be a matter of degree for many stakeholders. They often
express reservations about its acceptability or specify conditions
under which it would be ethically acceptable. For example,
neuroenhancement could be acceptable to some if its use was
controlled and moderate (Forlini and Racine, 2009; Bell et al.,
2013). The use of neuroenhancing substances was found to be
more acceptable when used to: enhance to the norm (Cabrera
et al., 2015), enable the true self (Riis et al., 2008), normalize
the performance of underperforming colleagues (Sabini and
Monterosso, 2005) or restore cognitive function caused by normal
age-associated memory impairment (Banjo et al., 2010) than
when used to enhance above the norm. The more acceptable
conditions of use were thought to reﬂect degree of medical
necessity, a key factor for many in distinguishing between
enhancement and treatment (Cabrera et al., 2015) as well as
a concern for fairness and equality of opportunity (Sabini
and Monterosso, 2005). Acceptability also varied with whether
the target for enhancement was seen as connected with the
authenticity of the individual (Riis et al., 2008; Berg et al., 2009).
Stakeholders seemed less willing to accept the neuroenhancement
of mood, emotions, and memory because they were seen to
be more closely associated with self-identity than aspects such
as concentration or alertness. These empirical ﬁndings on
the degrees of acceptability of neuroenhancement may not ﬁt
neatly into the principled approach of normative ethics. They
also challenge the myth of widespread stakeholder interest in
neuroenhancement (Farah et al., 2004; Greely et al., 2008) because
stakeholder perspectives are not as resoundingly liberal as often
assumed by proponents of enhancement.
Ignoring the Socio-Economic
Infrastructures That Influence Decisions
Empirical ethics research not only studies the normative values
held by stakeholders; it also describes their actions and behaviors
in situations that call for a moral choice. Empirical inquiry
has revealed that some stakeholders feel under pressure to
perform and believe that they have “no choice” except to use
neuroenhancers, despite also believing that this choice should
be an individual or personal matter (Forlini and Racine, 2009).
Stakeholders are also more willing to use neuroenhancers if
they believe that their peers are doing so in order to avoid
being at a social disadvantage (Franke et al., 2012a; Sattler
et al., 2013). Other studies have found more modest (Fitz
et al., 2014) and sometimes opposite eﬀects of peer pressure
(Forlini et al., 2015). These diﬀerences may reﬂect cultural or
contextual diﬀerences in stakeholder perspectives that merit
further investigation.
Equality of access was another major ethical concern for
stakeholders. The majority agreed that if neuroenhancement
was allowed then it should be available to everyone but very
few thought that the cost of neuroenhancers should be covered
by health insurance (Bergstrom and Lynoe, 2008; Hotze et al.,
2011; Forlini and Racine, 2012a). The roles of peer pressure
and equality of access show that professed ethical values do not
always translate into behavior and that socioeconomic factors
may inﬂuence decisions to use or not to use neuroenhancement
as much as ethical values.
Bioethicists often assume “an implausible degree of
rationality”, individual freedom and consistency in human
decisions, motivations, and actions (Solomon, 2005). An
individual’s decision to use neuroenhancement is multi-faceted
and ethical norms may only comprise one factor. There may
also be inconsistencies between personal values and behavior
because when “faced with an ethical dilemma, people do not
always think about what they ought to do in isolation from what
they are currently doing” (Ives and Draper, 2009). Fear of being
at a disadvantage, or worries about scarce health resources, may
inﬂuence attitudes toward enhancement more than values like
personal choice or equality of opportunity. Schelle et al. (2014)
postulate that stakeholders, especially neuroenhancement users,
can experience cognitive dissonance, which is “the discomfort
experienced when one’s actions don’t reﬂect one’s beliefs.” This
dissonance will persist until values catch up with the demands




Empirical data shows that stakeholders have diﬃculty balancing
safety and autonomy. On the one hand, many stakeholders
believe that using neuroenhancement is a personal choice for
which individuals must take responsibility (Forlini and Racine,
2009; Franke et al., 2012a; Bell et al., 2013). Part of this
responsibility is to make decisions that may aﬀect one’s health
(Forlini and Racine, 2009; Banjo et al., 2010) and to evaluate
the risks of doing so. Neuroenhancers are prepared to tolerate
mild to moderate adverse side eﬀects but are deterred by
the prospects of long-term and serious side eﬀects (Franke
et al., 2012b; Sattler et al., 2013). These beliefs reﬂect the
liberal perspective on neuroenhancement which champions the
autonomy of individuals and their right to incur whatever risks
that they are comfortable with incurring (Sententia, 2004). On
the other hand, for many stakeholders safety is paramount. Even
when presented with a hypothetically safe cognitive enhancer
in a study vignette, Banjo et al. (2010) found that, “physicians
mistrust safety claims regarding pharmaceuticals.” For these
physicians, safety concerns “were not oﬀset by the beneﬁt
aﬀorded the individual” (Banjo et al., 2010). Similarly, Hotze
et al. (2011) reported that a hypothetically safe neuroenhancer
was seen as unacceptable because they were regarded as being
“too risky” (for reasons unspeciﬁed in the survey) or likely to
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cause negative behaviors (e.g., making a soldier more aggressive).
These perspectives are consistent with the conservative stance
that the uncertain safety of neuroenhancement trumps individual
autonomy (Heinz et al., 2012).
Stakeholders’ perspectives on the values of safety and
autonomy are well deﬁned but the challenge is to balance the
two in ways that place socially agreed limits on acceptable
forms of neuroenhancement. The use of an enhancer that
was unsafe and used under coercion would be unacceptable,
regardless of political stance. Given this, it is may be useful to
explore stakeholder trade-oﬀs between these two values under
scenarios that vary by degrees in safety and autonomy. This would
illuminate the level of risk that was seen as appropriate for an
individual to take in pursuit of neuroenhancement and views on
the extent to which individuals should be prevented from taking
this risk to protect them from harm.
BRIDGING IS AND OUGHT WITH “CAN”
Empirical data can help bioethicists to understand the values
of stakeholders so that theory and policies can be made more
relevant and eﬀective (Ives and Draper, 2009). If principles
“are too abstract or practically not feasible” then normative
ethics fails to guide action (de Vries and Gordijn, 2009).
Until normative-empirical tensions are unwound it would be
diﬃcult to carry out a constructive discourse that informs
policy. As more empirical data on stakeholder perspectives about
the ethics of neuroenhancement emerge, normative bioethicists
may have to revisit their discussions of ethical principles
for two reasons. First, this process may create a negotiated
space between what people “ought” to do and what they
actually “can” do within existing socio-economic frameworks.
Discovering what can be done will require normative and
empirical research to test the degrees of public acceptability.
This may identify an “ethical tipping point” in a debate still
plagued with ambivalence about many of the salient issues.
Second, empirical data may uncover unethical behavior that
does not respect traditional social values. If, for example,
we discovered that certain professional environments obliged
employees to take cognitive enhancers in order to be more
productive most would object on the grounds that this practice
was coercive, regardless of whether or not the enhancer was
safe.
Normative ethics might also have the task of reinforcing
values and promoting ethical behavior. Drawing attention to
and working through tensions between normative principles
and behavior may help to reﬁne the most signiﬁcant ethical
values for stakeholders. This exercise is sorely needed to, ﬁrst,
distance research on the ethics of neuroenhancement from the
culture wars and an uncritical acceptance of the myths of
cognitive enhancement, and second, to increase social dialogue
and deliberation on the acceptability of neuroenhancement and
thereby reinvigorate the mandate of bioethics to enrich societal
perspectives by closely examining contentious issues.
CONCLUSION
Future research on the ethics of neuroenhancement should
assess the values that are most morally signiﬁcant to the
public in order to better understand how the public approaches
neuroenhancement. We need to ﬁll the gap between what ought
to be done and what is done by a better understanding of what
can be done in a particular social context. In doing so, we
should avoid assuming that principles and practices, concepts,
and experience will not change. As Solomon (2005) comments,
practice “guidelines persist, taking a life if their own, while the
conditions that motivated them change.” It is the responsibility
of bioethicists to “formulate and reformulate our ethical theories”
(Frith, 2012) to keep the reﬂections relevant to public policy
debates.
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